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did not have notice or could not be charged with notice of the fact that
the condition subsequent had been broken.'"
The rule in this case should not be extended to apply to a brief use of
the property inconsistent with the conditions in the deed, followed by
resumption of a proper use. In such a situation the grantee should not
be able to successfully contend that the power to terminate for any
future use inconsistent with the particular condition has been lost 1 '
However, the grantee might successfully argue that the grantor should
not be allowed to exercise his power to terminate with respect to the
prior occurrence of the condition.
TORTS
Abolition of Doctrine of Charitable Immunities. The doctrine
of charitable immunity in Washington appears to have been finally
abolished by two recent decisions of the Washington Supreme Court.
In Friend v. Cove Methodist Chuch, Inc., 65 Wash. Dec.2d 155, 396
P.2d 546 (1964), plaintiffs attended a smorgasbord dinner at defendant's church as "invited members of the public."' Directed to a
certain door as leading to the kitchen, plaintiff wife opened the door
and was severely injured when she fell into an open furnace pit. In the
second decision, Herbert v. Corporation of Catholic Archbishop, 65
Wash. Dec.2d 165, 396 P.2d 552 (1964), plaintiff attended a Rosary
service and was injured when she tripped over a low wire fence. Each
plaintiff brought action for personal injuries, alleging negligent maintenance of defendant's premises. The cause of action was dismissed by
the trial court in Friend, and summary judgment for defendant was
granted in Herbert. In successive en banc decisions on appeal, held: A
religious charity may be sued by a non-paying patron for injuries
sustained as a result of the charity's negligence, and the defense of
charitable immunity from tort liability is abolished.

isWith respect to adverse possession, the statute of limitations does not begin to
run against an adverse possessor until a possession meets all the elements of adversity
under the statute. In Washington adverse possession must be open and notorious.
Slater v. Murphy, 55 Wn.2d 892,339 P2d 457 (1959). The word "notorious" means that
for possession to be adverse, it must be such as to give actual or constructive notice of
its existence to the land owner. Certainly it is enough if the owner has actual knowledge of the fact. This is not necessary, however, if the acts of possession are such as to
charge a reasonable man in the owner's position with notice of adverse possession.
Stoebuck, The Law of Adverse Possession in Washington, 35 WASH. L. Rxv. 53, 72
(1960).
1"See, e.g., Richie v. Kansas, N. & D. R.R., 55 Kan. 36, 39 Pac. 718 (1895) ; Annot.,
39 A.L.R.2d 1116 (1955).
'65 Wash. Dec2d at 155, 396 P2d at 547.
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A Washington charitable corporation was first held to be immune
from liability for the negligence of its servants in Richardson v. Carbon
Hill Coal Co2 This judicially created doctrine appeared to have been
judicially abolished in Pierce v. Yakima Valley Memorial Hosp. Ass'n,'
in which the court held that a paying patient in a charitable hospital
could recover for an employee's negligence. The court in Pierce, sitting
en banc, stated its position as follows: "It is our conclusion that there
is today no factual justification for [charitable] immunity... and that
principles of law, logic, and intrinsic justice demand that the mantle of
immunity be withdrawn."' Two years later, in the departmental decision of Lyons v. Tumwater EvangelicalFree Church,5 the Washington
court retreated from its position, holding that charitable immunity still
applied to non-financial religious activity. The Pierce decision was
distinguished: "[T]he Pierce case.., did not reject the rule of charitable immunity, but merely modified it.... We do not wish to extend
the above holding to apply to a non-profit, religious organization which
transports children, without charge ....I In 1961 the Washington
court extended the Lyons rationale to a financial, but non-profit,
religious activity.'
With the decisions in the two principal cases the Washington Supreme
Court has done what most authorities' thought had been done by
Pierce. Though no explicit statement in the Friendopinion so indicates,
a possibility existed under the facts that the church was engaged in a
profit-seeking venture.' The facts of the Herbert case, on the other
hand, contain no suggestion whatever of financial benefit to the defendant. Thus it would appear that these combined decisions abolish the
"financial" distinction adopted by the court in Lyons.
It might be argued that a valid distinction between types of charities
can still be made. This distinction seems remote, however, as the court
stated in Friendthat, "The reasons given in [Pierce] ...apply no less
to churches, colleges, and other charities than to hospitals."'" Hopefully, it may now be stated with certainty that Washington has joined
26

Wash. 52, 32 Pac. 1012 (1893).
2

2 43 WnI d 162, 260 P.2d 765 (1953).

4 Id.at 178, 260 P2d at 774.
547 Wn2d 202, 287 P2d 128 (1955). See Comment, 31 WAsHr. L. REV. 287 (1956).
6Id.at 204, 287 P2d at 130.

7
Pederson v. Immanuel Lutheran Church, 57 Wn2d 576, 358 P2d 549 (1961), 37
WAsH. L. Ray. 242 (1962).
8E.g., 2 HAmERa & JAitEs, ToRTs § 29.17 at 1671-72 (1956) ; PRossER, TORTS § 109
at n. 85 (2d ed. 1955).

9 Brief for Appellant, pp. 5-6.
10 65 Wash. Dec.2d at 159, 396 P2d at 550.
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the twenty-two states which have completely repudiated charitable
immunity, 12 a trend universally applauded by writers in the field. 2
Barring legislative reversal, " Washington will presumably remain there.
Intentional Interference With Contractual Relationship-Maicious Interference With Attorney-Client Relationship. The Washington Supreme court recently decided a case having personal as well
as professional interest to the legal profession. Plaintiff, an attorney,
was requested by a widow to make arrangements whereby she could
continue her deceased husband's business, and initiated probate of the
husband's estate. Defendants, tax consultants and certified public
accountants, were later retained by the widow to perform the estate's
tax work. At defendant's urging, the widow selected another attorney
from a list furnished by defendants and terminated plaintiff's employ-

ment. Plaintiff, upon inquiry, was informed by defendants that they
hired and fired attorneys for their clients. Plaintiff sued for damages
in the amount of his expectable attorney's fees, alleging that defendants
had intentionally interfered with his employment contract. On appeal
from a judgment for plaintiff, held: The defense of privilege is not
available to a third party who maliciously interferes with a contract
terminable at will. Calbom v. Knudtzon, 65 Wash. Dec.2d 137, 396
P.2d 148 (1964).
Intentional interference in the contract rights of others is an
actionable tort in Washington.' The tort consists of an intentional act,
committed with knowledge of the plaintiff's economic interest, which
interferes with an existing valid contractual relationship or business
expectancy of the plaintiff, and causes damage to the plaintiff.2 The
interference may be privileged, however, if its purpose is protection of
" See 2 HAiwun

1964).

& JAMES,

TORTS 1671 (1956) ;

§ 29.17;

PROSSmE,

TORTS

§ 127 at 1023 (3rd ed.

§ 127; Spencer, Ray v.
Tucson Medical Center: A Reappraisalof Tort Liability of Charities,24 RocxY MT.
12 E.g., 2 H~aRa & JA

_s, TORTS

PROssER, TORTS

L. REV. 71 (1951).

:s See N.J. REv. STAT. §§ 2A :53A-7-11 (Supp. 1962); Collopy v. Newark Eye &
Ear Infirmary, 27 N.J. 29, 141 A2d 276 (1958); Peck, The Role of the Courts and
Legislatures in the Reform of Tort Law, 48 MINN. L. Rav. 265, 288 (1963).
1 Titus v. Tacoma Smeltermen's Union, 62 Wn.2d 461, 383 P.2d 504 (1963) ; Hein v.
Chrysler Corp., 45 Wn2d 586, 277 P.2d 504 (1954); Sears v. International Bhd. of
Teamsters, 8 Wn.2d 447, 112 P.2d 850 (1941) ; Porter v. King County Medical Society,
186 Wash. 410, 58 P2d 367 (1936); Pacific Typesetting Co. v. International Typographical Union, 125 Wash. 273, 216 Pac. 358 (1923); Seidell v. Taylor, 86 Wash.
645, 151 Pac. 41 (1915) ; Jones v. Leslie, 61 Wash. 107, 112 Pac. 81 (1910).
2 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 766 (1939). See 65 Wash. Dec2d at 142, 396 P2d at 151.

